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Insurance
By Maximilian A. Pock*

In order to provide desirable continuity and to facilitate cross-referencing this survey will generally conform to the overall organization of past
surveys and use identical categories and chapter headings. Where certiorari has been denied or applied for but not disposed of during the survey
period, this will be so indicated in the footnotes.
I.

LEGISLATION

The Uninsured Motorist Act' was amended to provide that vehicles are
deemed uninsured to the extent that they carry coverages with liability
limits below those found in the uninsured motorist endorsement of the
insured. 2 This allows the cautious insured who has troubled to buy optional uninsured motorist coverage beyond the statutory minimum to reduce losses caused by "underinsured" motorists by recovering from his
own insurer the difference between his uninsured coverage and the liability coverage of the tortfeasor. Prior law incongrously restricted the recovery of such insured to the difference between the statutory minimum for
s
uninsured motorist coverage and the liability coverage of the tortfeasor
The Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act,' Georgia's version of "no
fault" automobile insurance, was amended for the thirteenth time since
its passage in 1974. The amendment is a modest one. It allows municipalities to classify violations of the Act, which are crimes against the state,
as "local" offenses by making them the subject matter of municipal
ordinances. 5
* Professor of Law, George Washington University, National Law Center. University of
Iowa (J.D., 1958); University of Michigan (S.J.D., 1962); Associate Professor of Law, Emory
University Law School (1961-65); Member of the Georgia Bar.
1.

GA. CODE ANN. § 56-407.1 (Supp. 1979).

2.
3.
4.
5.

1980 Ga. Laws 1428.
See Pock, Insurance, Annual Survey of Ga. Law, 30 MERCER L. REV. 105, 121 (1978).
GA. CoDE ANN. ch. 56-34B (1977).
1980 Ga. Laws 1431.
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The 1980 Georgia General Assembly also contributed to the nationwide
consumerist trend toward making accident and sickness insurance one of
the most pervasively regulated fields of insurance law. Purveyors of accident and sickness policies that are designed primarily to supplement federal "medicare" or state "medicaid" will now be required to provide reasonable economic benefits in relation to the premium paid and to this end
will be subjected to close scrutiny in regard to policy content and business gathering methods.6 Neither individual nor group accident or health
insurance policies that are offered for sale in Georgia may in the future
contain a provision for terminating a spouse's coverage under the policy
solely because of "a break in the marital relationship except by reason of
entry of a valid decree of divorce between the parties. '7 In case of divorce
the formerly covered spouse must be given conversion privileges without
evidence of insurability.' Contracts of accident and sickness insurance
that provide coverage for services within the scope of a licensed chiropractor' or a licensed applied psychologist " must now provide that reimbursements are payable regardless of whether such services are performed
by a doctor of medicine, a chiropractor, or an applied psychologist respectively. Similarly, contracts of accident and sickness insurance which provide coverage for certain medical and surgical procedures when performed on an inpatient basis must now, under specified conditions,
extend such coverage to identical services when performed on an outpatient basis.1
"Property insurance," in the form of service or extended warranty
agreements on motor vehicles and family residential building structures,
that is issued by a party other than the insurer, so that the holder must
make claim in the first instance against the issuer, will have to provide
that "the holder shall be entitled to make a direct claim against the insurer after failure of the issuer to pay any claim within 60 days after
proof of loss.""

Property and casualty insurers are now prohibited from cancelling,
modifying, or failing to renew policies "solely because the applicant or
insured or any employee is either mentally or physically impaired.""
The remaining enactments of the 1980 Georgia General Assembly are
of a technical-administrative character and, hence, of limited interest.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1393.
Id. at 1393-94.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1249-50.
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1011-12 (emphasis added).
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They include amendments relating to certificates of authority, fee payment deadlines, licensure of agents," and regulation of reinsurance
placed with foreign and alien insurers.' 5

.I.
A.

CONSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

Additional Automobile

In Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miles, 6 an automobile liability policy covered a "replacement" automobile defined as "a private
passenger, farm or utility automobile of which the named insured acquires ownership, provided it replaces the owned automobile"' 7 and an
"additional" automobile defined as "an additional private passenger, farm
or utility automobile of which the named insured acquires ownership,
provided notice of its delivery be given to the company within 30 days
following the date of its delivery."' 8 The insured's Pontiac was damaged
in an accident and, although it was never repaired or returned to service,
the insured did not part with it. Some time after the accident the insured's husband bought her a Plymouth and the insurer was promptly
notified of its acquisition. It was held that the Plymouth, although failing
to qualify as a "replacement" automobile because ownership in the "replaced" car had continued in the insured, did qualify as an "additional"
automobile as the policy itself defined that term.
B.

Forgery

"Tillie, the All-Time Teller Card" was issued (unsolicited) to an insured homeowner to allow her to withdraw funds from her bank accounts
at any time. The card operated much like a check, except that "[i]nstead
of requiring the signature of the drawer to authorize the withdrawal of
funds, a recording of the personal identification number of the drawercardholder [was] necessary to validate the withdrawal of funds from the
cardholder's account."' 9
The card was stolen and the thief, by recording the victimized owner's
personal identification number, unlawfully directed the bank to pay him
a sum certain in money. Was this theft of the bank card, which resulted
in an aggregate monetary loss of $9,900, covered in full under the policy's
general theft provision for unscheduled personal property or was it cov14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1108.
152 Ga. App. 744, 263 S.E.2d 708 (1979).
Id. at 745, 263 S.E.2d at 709.
Id.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Renshaw, 151 Ga. App. 80, 82, 258 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1979).
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ered only for a maximum of $1,000 under its forgery provision?
The court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Renshaw2" held, as a matter of
law, that the loss had not resulted from a theft but from a forgery. In the
absence of a definition in the policy itself, the court applied the definition
of forgery found in the criminal code, which in pertinent part states that
"a person commits forgery .. .when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly makes, alters or possesses any writing in a fictitious name or in
such manner that the writing as made or altered purports to have been
made by another person. . . . "I'It also applied the definition of "writing" as found in the criminal code which includes, but is not limited to,
"printing or any other method of recording information, money, coins,
tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks and other symbols
of value, right, privilege, or identification."22
C. Household
Can two people live fifteen miles apart and still be residents of the
same household as that term is used in omnibus clauses and uninsured
motorist riders? According to the court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gazaway,2 the answer may be a qualified yes! The
uncontested facts were that a husband and wife, while married at the
time of an automobile accident, had been residing apart in separate mobile homes for about seven years. There was evidence of marital discord,
but they were never divorced nor legally separated and neither of these
legal conditions was under consideration. The homes were about fifteen
miles apart. Their children stayed with the wife during the week and the
husband almost every weekend. The home in which the wife lived was
titled in the name of the husband. The husband paid the wife a regular
weekly allowance for her and the children's support and in addition
"picked up" her utility and medical bills which would often come to him
in the mail. The couple filed joint income tax returns and the husband's
hospitalization policy listed the wife as beneficiary.
These uncontradicted facts did not, as a matter of law, establish that
the wife had ceased being a member of the husband's household. In holding that a jury question was presented, the court of appeals shifted from
an earlier definition of household as "a collective body of persons who live
in one house or within the same curtilage and under one head or management ''2 4 to a more recent definition of household as "a domestic establish20.
21.

151 Ga. App. 80, 258 S.E.2d 744 (1979).
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1701 (1977) (emphasis added).
22. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1703 (1977) (emphasis added).
23. 152 Ga. App. 716, 263 S.E.2d 693 (1979), petition for cert. filed.
24. Id. at 720, 263 S.E.2d at 696.
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ment under a single management."2 The court concluded that in this
time of mobility and diversified lifestyle this more recent definition was a
more accurate reflection of the intent of the legislature in mandating residence in the household of the insured as the touchstone of certain
coverages."
D.

Reasonable Proof

The Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act provides that nofault benefits "are overdue if not paid within 30 days after the insurer
receives reasonable proof of the fact and the amount of loss sustained.""
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Moss 2 the court held that, as the
statute did not define reasonable proof in any way, the court had to turn
to cases decided under tort law for guidance. Thus, a plaintiff seeking nofault benefits for lost wages, who was paid by the job rather than by the
hour, had to produce evidence to show that he had jobs waiting for him at
the times he was unable to work, what they were, and that he did not
have the opportunity later to do these jobs."'
E.

Sessions or Visits for all Outpatient Treatment

A health policy covering psychiatric services limited benefits to "a total
of 20 sessions or visits for all outpatient treatment . . per covered person per calendar year . . ."3 without defining what it meant by "sessions" or "visits." When the insured filed a claim, the insurer denied a
portion of it on the grounds that some of the individual visits for which
reimbursement was sought exceeded an hour and the group sessions exceeded ninety minutes.
Was it proper to establish the contractual signification of sessions and
visits by expert medical testimony that it was commonly understood and
recognized within the medical profession, and in the specialty of psychiatry in particular, that the term "session" referred to a period of time from
50 to 90 minutes and the term "visit" referred to a period of time from 50
to 60 minutes? The court in Fillion v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.' 1
25. Id.
26. It is peculiar that in formulating this "modern" definition the court relied in part on
the "ancient" notion that the husband was the head of the household and thus empowered
to fix the family domicile, a notion which is embedded in the Georgia Code. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 53-501 (1974).
27. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3406b(b) (1977) (emphasis added).
28. 152 Ga. App. 84, 262 S.E.2d 248 (1979).
29. Id. at 85, 262 S.E.2d at 249.
30. Fillion v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 150 Ga. App. 619, 619, 258 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1979)
(emphasis added).
31. 150 Ga. App. 619, 258 S.E.2d 222 (1979).
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held that these words were no more technical than common words such as
"road." In the absence of any indication in the contract that they were
used in a narrow technical sense, the insured had the right to place upon
them their usual, natural, and ordinary interpretation, which was not
subject to modification by opinions of so-called experts.
F. Use of a Motor Vehicle
In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Nelson,s2 the driver
of a tractor-trailer "rig" was killed when a cargo of lumber loaded upon
the trailer shifted and fell on him. At the time of his death, the driver
had been in the process of jacking up the loaded trailer and reconnecting
it to the tractor. Did his death arise out of the "operation, maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle""3 as defined by the Motor Vehicle
Accident Reparations Act?
The court conceded that a trailer incapable of self-propulsion and
standing unattached to any means of propulsion was not a motor vehicle,
but it noted that the definition of motor vehicle specifically included "a
trailer drawn by or attached to such a vehicle"3' 4 which meant that the
tractor-trailer "rigs" were motor vehicles. Even if the trailer had not yet
become reconnected to the tractor and thus had not yet become a motor
vehicle within the intendment of the statute, the process of connecting or
reconnecting the trailer, which resulted in the driver's death, was part of
the normal use of the tractoras a motor vehicle and therefore an activity
covered under the statute.
G.

Wrongful Entry or Eviction

In CincinnatiInsurance Co. v. Davis,3 5 the insured held a comprehensive general liability or "umbrella" policy which obligated the insurer to
pay on behalf of the insured all damages because of an "accident" resulting in property damage "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured" 6 and which excluded coverage while that property
was "in the care, custody or control of the insured or as
to which the
3' 7
insured was for any purpose exercising physical control.
The insured had also purchased several scheduled underlying policies
for specific coverages that formed a part of the "umbrella" policy. One of
these extended coverages for injuries arising out of one or more "offenses"
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

153 Ga. App. 623, 266 S.E.2d
§ 56-3402b(h)
§ 56-3402b(a)
153 Ga. App. 291, 265 S.E.2d
Id. at 292, 265 S.E.2d at 104.
Id.
GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.

299 (1980), petition for cert. filed.
(1977) (emphasis added).
(1977).
102 (1980), petition for cert. filed.
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committed in the conduct of the insured's somewhat friction-prone business; these included "wrongful entry or eviction or other invasions of the
right to private occupancy." 8 The policy contained no references to "accidents" or exclusionary language regarding property in the care of the
insured.
The insured obtained a dispossessory warrant against one of his tenants for delinquency in rental payments and through his agent removed
some of the tenant's television sets from the leased warehouse and stored
them in one of his other warehouses for safekeeping. It turned out that
the eviction was deficient because of improper service of notice which resulted in the taking and safekeeping of the sets being classified as a conversion. It was held that this conversion, which was purely technical in
that it did not result from a deliberate trespass without color of right,
arose out of a wrongful entry or eviction and was, therefore, covered
under the scheduled policy forming a component of the "umbrella" policy. The coverages and exclusions of the scheduled underlying policies,
which were specifically tailored to accomodate varied and diverse interests, superseded conflicting language in the "umbrella" policy. Hence, the
insurer's contentions that the conversion was not an "accident" because it
was intended by the insured and that the liability arose while the insured
was in physical control of the sets and was therefore specifically excluded
were rejected.

III.
A.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Agent, Notice to

In Barnes v. Mangham,39 a signed application for automobile insurance
showed that uninsured motorist coverage was rejected by the applicant.
The court noted that "[tihe fact of this rejection [was] also reflected on
the policy's declaration sheet, which contain[ed] a further indication that
no premium was charged for that coverage." ' Some three months after
issuance of the policy, the insured had a collision with an uninsured motorist. She testified in her deposition that she had not read the policy
until after the accident, that she had signed the application in blank,
that she had requested the insurer's agent to provide her with "full coverage" and that the agent has assured her that she would indeed receive
"full coverage." It was held that the insured's deposition showed that she
had been given ample opportunity to read the policy and to reject it as
written or to renegotiate it with the insurer if the coverage requested was
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 293, 265 S.E.2d at 104 (emphasis added).
153 Ga. App. 540, 265 S.E.2d 867 (1980).
Id. at 540, 265 S.E.2d at 868.
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not in fact tendered. She had thus failed to perform her "duty to read the
policy."' 41 Hence, a summary judgment for the insurer was justified.

This decision is in keeping with the trend to hold that the insured is
bound by the contract as written, whether the insured has read it or
not. 2 Yet it is strangely at odds with other areas of consumer law where a
failure to read recondite contracts of adhesion is readily forgiven.43
B.

Application

-

Misrepresentation

Georgia Insurance Department regulations governing assigned risk
plans provide that subscriber insurance companies "shall not be required
to afford or continue insurance . . . if any person who usually drives a
motor vehicle does not hold . . . an operator's license."" Is an applicant

for insurance under the assigned risk plan guilty of a misrepresentation
making the policy void ab initio if, without notice or knowledge that his
license had in fact been suspended, he states in the application that he
held a valid operator's license? The court in Virginia Mutual Insurance
-Co. v. Hayes"5 held that he well might be. Knowledge of the falsity of the
representation is irrelevant; the only issue is the representation's materiality to the risk, which poses a question of fact for the jury.
In a cognate case an applicant for automobile insurance stated in the
application that "no driver or member of the household in the past five
years had been convicted of or forfeited bail for any traffic violation."' 6 A
later investigation revealed that the applicant had been guilty of several
moving traffic violations during the period in question. Sentry Indemnity
Co. v. Brady47 held that the insurer was entitled to a declaratory judgment that the policy was void ab initio on a showing that, had the true
information about the applicant's driving record been known, the premium would have been greater than the premium for which the policy
was in fact issued.
41. This is really a misnomer. If there were such duty its breach would be liability creating. Conceptually, it is really a condition of the insurer's liability which, like all conditions,
may be enforced by forfeiture. The insurer thus may have a defense in an action brought by
the insured, rather than a cause of action against the insured.
42. A trend noticed by Professor Vance as many as thirty years ago. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1951).
43. Occasionally one finds cases even in insurance law where this is the case, or where,
after lip service is paid to the duty to read, the insured is treated with great solicitude. See,
e.g., Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 255 A.2d 208 (1969) (treating the agent's statements as an inception-estoppel to extend the coverage provided by the delivered policy).
44. Regulation 120-2-14-.09(3) on file in the office of the Comptroller General in accordance with GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-124 (1975) (emphasis added).
45. 150 Ga. App. 756, 258 S.E.2d 617 (1979), petition for cert. filed.
46. Sentry Indem. Co. v. Brady, 153 Ga. App. 168, 168-69, 264 S.E.2d 702, 703 (1980).
47. 153 Ga. App. 168, 264 S.E.2d 702 (1980).
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Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. First Federal Savings
& Loan Association of Statesboro"8 reads like an ALR annotation on a
mortgagee-loss payee's duty to disclose to the insurer facts bearing upon
the risk assumed. The focal point of the controversy was a certain homeowner's policy which was issued to the mortgagor-insured and later reinstated after cancellation for nonpayment of premiums. The mortgageeloss payee, 9 seeking to avoid a lapse of coverage occasioned by cancellation of a prior policy, helped in securing the issuance of the policy in
question and its later reinstatement by promising that it would pay the
premium if the insured did not. It was never called upon to keep those
promises because the insured himself paid the premium in cash. After a
fire causing the total loss of the insured's dwelling, the insurer sought to
avoid the policy, as against the mortgagee, on the grounds that its failure
to inform the insurer that the mortgagor-insured was in default on his
mortgage payments at the time the policy was issued constituted inceptive fraud. The court held that, even assuming such factor to be material
in fact, the insurer could not assert its materiality unless it made an inquiry about it and received a misstatement in response or apprised its
prospective insured of its materiality and was met with deliberate silence.
The court also found that the mortgagee's help in securing issuance and
reinstatement of the policy in question was solely prompted by a natural
desire to protect its own interest. The mortgagee was not acting as an
agent on behalf of the insured or as a fiduciary in relatioi to the insurer.
The insurer then claimed that the mortgagee had forfeited coverage by
failure to comply with a policy provision requiring notification of the insurer "of any change in ownership, occupancy or substantial change in
risk of which the mortgagee is aware." 50 The court held that such duty to
notify did not arise until after issuance of the policy and was at any rate
limited to "risk[s] relative to the dwelling, not a financial risk involving
the insured."51
The insurer finally claimed that the mortgagee had forfeited coverage
by failing to submit a timely proof of loss. The policy, in language formally addressed to the named insured, stated that "If we deny your
claim, that denial shall not apply to a valid claim of the mortgagee, if the
mortgagee: submits a signed, sworn statement of loss within 60 days after
receiving notice from us of your failure to do so."52 It was undisputed
that the insurer had only sent the mortgagee notice of the failure of the
named insured to recover under the policy. This, the court held, did not
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

152 Ga. App. 16, 262 S.E.2d 147 (1979).
The case does not disclose whether an open or union mortgage clause was involved.
152 Ga. App. at 19, 262 S.E.2d at 150 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 20, 262 S.E.2d at 150-51 (emphasis added).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

comply with the policy terms. The insurer should have sent the mortgagee notice of the insured's failure to submit a statement of loss within
sixty days after request. Only such notice would have informed the mortgagee that it had sixty days in which to make a statement of its own.
C.

Attorney's Fees and Statutory Penalties

What is the proper standard of review of a jury verdict for attorney's
53
fees and penalties?
In Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. McClain,54 the supreme
court essayed an answer to this vexing question certified to it by the court
of appeals by stating:
[W]e disapprove the rule that a finding of bad faith is not authorized if
the evidence would have supported a verdict in accordance with the contentions of the defendant. This is an 'any evidence' rule being used to
reverse a judgment. Such a rule virtually precludes a finding of bad faith
and allows unreasonable defenses to delay payment with impunity. The
proper rule is that the judgment should be affirmed if there is any evidence to support it unless it can be said as a matter of law that there is
58
a reasonable defense which vindicates the good faith of the insurer.

The salubrious effect of this decision cannot be overestimated." It is
bound to increase the number of cases where attorney's fees and penalties
awards will stand the acid test of an appeal and to enhance their predictability.5 7 During the current survey period, the court of appeals applied
the test of Colonial Life on no less than five occasions and upheld the
award of attorney's fees and penalties in all of them!58
53.

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 56-1206

(1977).

54. 243 Ga. 263, 253 S.E.2d 745 (1979).
55. Id. at 265, 253 S.E.2d at 746.
56. One commentator, in a splendid piece on bad faith refusal to pay, concedes only that
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 243 Ga. 263, 253 S.E.2d 745 (1979) reflects but "a trend
toward a more sympathetic treatment of the bad faith remedy." See Wrongful Refusal to
Pay Insurance Claims in Georgia, 13 GA. L. Rzv. 935, 936 (1979). This seems an excessively
modest view of the situation.
57. Despite the supreme court's failure to answer the second certified question of
whether the determination of the insurer's bad faith was a threshold question of law for the
judge, or a factual question for the jury or both.
58. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mills Plumbing Co., Inc., 152 Ga. App. 531, 263 S.E.2d
270 (1970), petition for cert. filed; Southern United Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 151 Ga. App.
798, 261 S.E.2d 742 (1979); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 153 Ga. App. 623,
266 S.E.2d 299 (1980), petition for cert. filed; Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunlap,
153 Ga. App. 116, 264 S.E.2d 483 (1980), petition for cert. filed. Guarantee Trust Life Ins.
Co. v. Davis, 143 Ga. App. 826, 256 S.E.2d 76 (1979) was reversed on the basis of the court
of appeals' misreading of the trial record, Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 244 Ga.
541, 261 S.E.2d 336 (1979). Allen v. National Liberty Life Ins. Co., 153 Ga. App. 579, 266
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An assessment of penalties is not a condition precedent to an award of
attorney's fees, but a finding of bad faith is. Thus, in Hardin v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co., 59 a jury award of attorney's fees of $5000 was found
to be unauthorized because the jury had specifically stated in its verdict
that "We find for the defendant no bad faith penalty." 60 Such negation of
bad faith, although perhaps inadvertent, necessarily nullifies the award of
attorney's fees.
McGhee v. Kroger Co. 1 raised the question whether a private employer
could be held liable for attorney's fees and penalties because of a failure
to pay or delay in paying compensation as ordered by the state board of
workers' compensation. It was held that it could not because such liability
was confined to insurers defined by the Code as "every person engaged as
indemnitor, surety or contractor who issues contracts of insurance. '
D.

Cancellation

The Georgia Code provides that notice of cancellation of an insurance
policy "may be delivered in person, or by depositing such notice in the
United States mails to be dispatched by at least first class mail to the last
address of record of the insured and receiving therefore the receipt provided by the United States Post Office Department."3 Cases have construed this statute to compel strict compliance but have not demanded a
talismanic use of form over substance. In Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Guess," the supreme court explained that the cancellation methods
adopted by the legislature were intended to assure actual notice of cancellation. Hence, the insured's own admission that he has actually received
the notice will cure the insurer's incomplete attempts to use the postal
service manifested in a failure to obtain the required post office receipt
upon mailing the notice.6 5 However, in the absence of actual receipt of
notice, even irrefragable proof of mailing will not avail the insurer unless
it can prove strict compliance by obtension of the required post office
receipt.
S.E.2d 269 (1980), while citing Colonial Life, did not involve GA. CoDE ANN. § 56-1206
(1977) but GA. CODE ANN. § 56-611 (1977) (penalties assessed against unauthorized insurers
based on a refusal that is "vexatious and without reasonable cause").
59. 150 Ga. App. 277, 257 S.E.2d 300 (1979), petition for cert. filed.
60. Id. at 277, 257 S.E.2d at 301.
61. 150 Ga. App. 291, 257 S.E.2d 361 (1979).
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-103 (1977).
63. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2430 (1977) (emphasis added).
64. 243 Ga. 559, 255 S.E.2d 55 (1979), rev'g Travelers Indem. Co. v. Guess, 148 Ga. App.
496, 251 S.E.2d 590 (1978).
65. See Pock, Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 31 MERCER L. REv. 117, 122
(1979).
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Does strict compliance with the mailing requirements effect cancellation if the insurer finds out that the notice had not in fact reached the
insured? This interesting question was posed in Favati v. National Property Owners Insurance Co.66 The insurer had properly mailed a notice of
cancellation and subsequently a check for the return of the premium to
what was indisputably the correct address of the insured. Thereafter, the
unopened notice of cancellation was returned by the post office indicating, erroneously, that the notice could not be delivered because the addressee had moved and left no forwarding address. However, the check
was received by the insured, endorsed personally by him and deposited to
his account in the bank. The insured, relying upon language in Travelers
Indemnity"' to the effect that the statute was meant to assure actual notice of cancellation, contended that the cancellation was ineffective because he had not actually received it. The court of appeals read Travelers
Indemnity more narrowly as merely placing upon the insurer the responsibility of taking adequate steps to do all within its power to assure that
its insured was put on notice that insurance coverage had been cancelled.
Notice by proper mailing was one permissible method of carrying out this
responsibility because it was calculated to reach the insured. However,
actual notice, while a desideratum, was not a condition precedent to an
effective cancellation. At any rate, if notice was required, it was provided
by the check which bore on its face statements, which by reasonable implication informed the insured, that the check represented a return of the
premium and that his auto policy, identified by number, had been
cancelled.
What constitutes a proper receipt provided by the post office? In
Favatil8 the court held that a notice of cancellation, which had upon it a
certificate by an employee of the insurer that she had delivered the notice
to the post office and which had superimposed a stamp of the local post
office showing the date, time, and place of delivery to the post office,
qualified as a proper receipt despite the fact that the "stamp" was affixed
without additional words specifically indicating "receipt." On a parity of
reasoning, the court in Hill v. Allstate Insurance Co." held that a
"PORS" list (a computer compilation prepared in the ordinary course of
business of the insurer containing names, addresses, and policy numbers
of all those policyholders whose policies were to be cancelled) which was
stamped by postal authorities to indicate receipt of the letters addressed
to those persons appearing on the list also qualified as proper receipt.
The Georgia Code also requires that the insurer tender a return of the
66.
67.
68.
69.

153
243
153
151

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

App. 723, 266 S.E.2d 359 (1980).
at 561, 255 S.E.2d at 56.
App. at 726, 266 S.E.2d at 361.
App. 542, 260 S.E.2d 370 (1979), petition for cert. filed.
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unearned premium within 15 days of notice of cancellation.7 0 Does this
require strict compliance in the sense that the insurer's tender within the
prescribed time limit is a condition precedent to cancellation? In Georgia
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fraser7' the insurer had properly mailed a notice of cancellation but had failed to make the required refund. It was
held that the cancellation was ineffective and that the policy was still in
force at the date of a loss which had occurred subsequently. Since no
refund had been attempted at any time before the loss, the case is inconclusive on the question of strict compliance with the prescribed time
limit.
E.

Cooperation

Occasionally insurance contracts, such as homeowners' and automobile
liability policies, to name but two striking examples, provide greater coverage than the average lay person expects. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Sloan7 shows that this fact, which ought to be applauded as a boon to the consumer, may not be an unalloyed blessing.
The undisputed facts showed that the insured carried two policies which
covered his son as a member of his household under the "omnibus"
clause. When his son was involved in a collision resulting in a wrongful
death claim against him, the insured believed that his son was not covered because he was not specifically named as an insured in either policy
and because the car he had been driving when he was involved in the
collision did not belong to the father or the son and was not insured
under any other policy. It simply did not occur to him that his son might
be covered by his policies. Accordingly, the initial attorney of the insured
informed the attorney representing the survivor in the wrongful death action that there was no insurance. About six months later the son contacted another attorney in connection with certain criminal proceedings,
who, upon investigation, discovered that coverage existed under the insured's policies. This attorney notified the attorney representing the survivor, who in turn promptly notified the insurer of the wrongful death
claim.
In determining whether the notice was received "as soon as practicable" as required by the cooperation clause in the policies, the court held
as follows: First, the facts posed a question for the jury. The trial court
could not as a matter of law summarily adjudicate that the six-month
delay in giving the notice was or was not in compliance with the cooperation clause. Second, there was no requirement that the insurer show itself
70.
71.
72.

GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2430 (1977).
152 Ga. App. 866, 264 S.E.2d 315 (1980), petition for cert. filed.
150 Ga. App. 464, 258 S.E.2d 146 (1979).
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to be harmed by the delay as a condition precedent to denying coverage
based on noncompliance with the cooperation clause. Third, the policy
requirement that the notice "be given by or on behalf of the insured""3
need only be substantially complied with. Thus it makes no difference
whether the insured, or, as in this case, the opposing party-claimant's attorney gives the notice so long as it is reasonable and timely and the insurer obtains actual knowledge of the pendency of a claim or suit. Fourth,
the precise wording of the cooperation clause must be scrutinized. Thus,
clauses requiring "immediate" notice may compel different results from
clauses requiring notice "as soon as practicable."
F.

Coverage -

Duration

In Wisener v. American Southern Insurance Co., 75 the plaintiff had
purchased an automobile liability policy providing coverage for a six
month period. The plaintiff had paid the premium for the original policy
in full but then neglected to make any further payments for renewal coverage. Seven months after the expiration date plaintiff had a collision.
Was he covered? It was held that the policy was automotically renewed
on its expiration date because the plaintiff had never been notified that
the insurer intended either to renew or not to renew the policy at the
expiration of its original term.7 1 It did not follow, however, that such renewal extended for all time at the insurer's expense. The court stated
that while "the purpose of the automatic renewal provisions is to protect
'77
both the insured and the public from loss of coverge due to oversight,
the legislature could hardly have intended such protection to be openended. Automatic renewal was meant to duplicate the terms of the original policy and to extend its coverage only for a like six month period.
78
In Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dunlaps
a homeowner's policy issued for three years provided coverage against loss occasioned by theft of unscheduled personal property in the amount of
$10,000. It further provided that if the insurer elected not to renew the
policy it would mail to the insured a timely nonrenewal notice. Instead of
a nonrenewal notice, the insured received only a single declaration renewal sheet, which recited the unscheduled personal property coverage to
the $10,000 amount in the exact language of the first policy, and an invoice, which she paid. It was established, however, that the insurer had
73.
74.
Ass'n.,
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 465, 258 S.E.2d at 147.
The court distinguished Sloan from Atlanta Int'l Prop. v. Georgia Underwriting
149 Ga. App. 701, 256 S.E.2d 472 (1979), on this ground.
150 Ga. App. 795, 258 S.E.2d 908 (1979).
See GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2430.1(c) (1977).
150 Ga. App. at 795, 258 S.E.2d at 909.
153 Ga. App. 116, 264 S.E.2d 483 (1980), petition for cert. filed.
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sent an amended renewal declaration to its agent which incorporated an
endorsement limiting recovery for theft of silverware to $1,000. Somehow
the agent had not followed the usual custom of attaching this declaration
sheet along with all the other endorsement forms to the policy and forwarding the entire "package policy" to the insured. It was held that the
new theft endorsement had not become part of the renewal policy. Since
she never received a nonrenewal notice apprising her of the insurer's intent not to renew the policy as originally written, the insured, upon receiving an incomplete communication in the form of a renewal declaration without attachments, and an invoice, could only conclude that the
policy was renewed according to its original terms. It was frivolous for the
insurer to contend that the insured was under a duty to examine the policy and was charged by law with knowledge of its coverage. The insured
could hardly be expected to examine or suspect the existence of an endorsement which she had never received, particularly in light of the fact
that the declaration she did receive was consistent on its face with the
policy as originally written.
G. Exceptions and Exclusions
In Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Crosby,9 a father filed suit
against officials of a school district "alleging negligent breach of duty to
safeguard school premises resulting in the attack and rape of his daughter
in the bathroom of a junior high school.""0 Although the officials were
insured against wrongful acts defined as "any. . .act or omission or neglect or breach of duty. . . in the discharge of school district duties,"81 the
insurer denied coverage relying upon an exclusion in the policy which
stated that the policy did not apply to "any damages, direct or consequential, arising from bodily injury.""2 Despite the fact that the plaintiff
sought compensation for bodily injury, mental anguish, and humiliation
caused by the rape, the court of appeals held that the bodily injury exclusion was inapplicable because claims were ultimately bottomed upon the
wrongful acts of the officials. 8 While the bodily injuries may have been
the immediate cause of the harm, they were themselves but intermediate
causes set into motion by the wrongful acts. It was therefore proper to
characterize the claim for damages as arising from the officials' breach of
79. 244 Ga. 456, 260 S.E.2d 860 (1979).
80. Id. at 456, 260 S.E.2d at 861.
81. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 149 Ga. App. 450, 451, 254 S.E.2d 485, 486
(1979).
82. 244 Ga. at 456, 260 S.E.2d at 861.
83. 149 Ga. App. at 451, 254 S.E.2d at 487. See Pock, Insurance, Annual Survey of Ga.
Law, 31 MERCER L. REv. 117, 125 (1979).
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duty. The supreme court reversed, 4 indicating that the central flaw in
this reasoning was the implicit assumption that the officials' neglect,
standing alone, had created a cause of action. Legally there could have
been no cause of action until their neglect eventuated in bodily injury.
Hence, the plaintiff's cause of action was for damages, direct or consequential, arising from bodily injury explicitly within the compass of the
exclusion.
H.

Limitation in Policy-Time for Suit

Is a suit filed eighteen months after a loss timely under a policy which
states, inter alia, that "no suit or action on this policy. . . shall be sustainable .. .unless commenced within twelve months next after inception of the loss" and that the "terms of this policy . . . which are in conflict with the statutes of this state wherein this policy is issued are hereby
amended to conform to such statutes"? 8 The court in Gravely v. Southern Trust Insurance Co.86 held that the one-year contractual limitation
was not in conflict with the statutory six-year limitation for simple contracts8 7 and hence was not displaced or amended by it. In order to have
the longer statutory limitation displace the shorter contractual limitation
it is necessary that the policy itself incorporate such statutory limitation
by specific reference, as was done in Queen Tufting Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co., s which involved a policy provision requiring that
suit be commenced within twelve months "unless a longer period of time
is provided by applicable statute." 8'
In Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'0 the court
held that actions against no-fault insurers were governed by the statutory
six-year limitation for simple contracts." Because culpability is not an
issue under the Motor Vehicle Accidents Reparation Act,'92 these actions
against the insurer, as the real party defendant, are bottomed on the insurance contract even though the special injury upon which the no-fault
claims are based may have been the product of a tort. Actions against
uninsured motorist carriers are conceptually on a different footing. They
are subject to the shorter statutory limitation for torts because uninsured
84. 244 Ga. at 457, 260 S.E.2d at 861.
85. Gravely v. Southern Trust Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 93, 258 S.E.2d 753 (1979), petition
for cert. filed.

86. Id.
87. GA. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1975).
88. 239 Ga. 843, 239 S.E.2d 27 (1977).

89. 239 Ga. at 844, 239 S.E.2d at 28.
90. 152 Ga. App. 825, 264 S.E.2d 296 (1979), petition for cert. filed.
91. GA. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1975).
92. See GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3401(b) (1977).
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motorist coverage, unlike no-fault insurance, presupposes liability in tort
and makes the insurer's liability purely derivative.3
The Georgia Code provides that if the defendant "shall have been
guilty of fraud by which the plaintiff shall have been debarred or deterred
from his action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of
the discovery of the fraud." In Lee v. All American Life & Casualty
Co."9 an insured's widow, filing an action for disability payments as executrix, tried to justify a ten-year delay in bringing the complaint by invoking this provision. She claimed that the insurer's written denial of further
liability for disability payments constituted fraud because it contained
two sentences that were somewhat confusing. The court reiterated that in
the absence of an established intent to deceive, the insurer's "statements
of opinion as to the legal effect of the provisions of an insurance contract
were not ordinarily actionable as fraud, there being no fiduciary relationship between the parties."" If the insured was not in any way prevented
from ascertaining the provisions of his policy and if the insurer's letter,
although somewhat confusing, was true, then a case for actionable fraud
could not be made out and the period of limitation was not "tolled."
I.

Loan Receipt

In Hall v. Helms,'7 an automobile owner collected from her collision
insurer $1,611.14 ($1,711.14 minus the $100 deductible) for property damage caused to her car by one Hall, the operator of the other vehicle involved in the collision. The insurer then convinced Hall's insurance carrier that Hall had been negligent, collected $1,711.14, remitted $100 of
this amount to the automobile owner insured and kept the remaining
$1,611.14 in repayment of the loan receipt. The automobile owner then
bought a tort action against Hall, alleging that her actual property damages were $4,250. A jury awarded her $2,300 as total damages, from which
the trial court refused to write off the $1,711.14 previously paid by Hall's
insurer and disbursed to the automobile owner through the loan receipt.
The court of appeals held that the verdict should have been reduced by
the previous payment. This reduction was not only required by the terms
of the loan receipt which obligated the borrower-insured to repay the loan
from such recovery as she might achieve by the prosecution of her claim
against the tortfeasor, but also by the indemnity principle which denies a

93.

Vaughn v. Collum, 236 Ga. 582, 224 S.E.2d 416 (1976).

94.

GA. CODE ANN.

95.
96.
97.

153 Ga. App. 733, 266 S.E.2d 248 (1980).
153 Ga. at 734, 266 S.E.2d at 249 (emphasis added).
150 Ga. App. 257, 257 S.E.2d 349 (1979).

§ 3-807 (1975).
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double recovery for a single injury.9 8
J.

Subrogation and Contribution

A wrongdoer who accepts a release from an insured with knowledge of
the insurer's subrogation rights does not cut off those rights. This is a
principle of long standing and beguiling simplicity. It allows the insurer
to have recourse to subrogation as though the release had never been
executed.
Does it allow an insured who has given a release in violation of a loan
receipt-subrogation agreement, prohibiting the insured from making any
settlement with parties potentially liable for a certain casualty loss, to
assert the ineffectiveness of the release and thus deny that the violation
has ever occurred? Does it allow the wrongdoer who, with full knowledge
of the existence of the agreement, has induced its breach and then accepted the release, to do the same?
The supreme court in Allen v. Unigard Insurance Co. 9 answered these
questions with a resounding "no." Equitable subrogation as well as contractual-conventional subrogation furnishes a claim against the wrongdoer. This claim is protected against destruction through releases made
deliberately with knowledge of its existence. This protection is equitable
in origin and provides only a remedy to the party wronged-the insurer.
"It was never intended as a vehicle in which the wrongdoer can ride to a
haven of immunity"10 0 and profit from his own wrong. Furthermore, subrogation against the wrongdoer, despite the release, is but a cumulative or
additional remedy available to the insurer. It is not meant to substitute
for the contract remedy against the insured for breach of the subrogation
agreement or for the torts remedy against the wrongdoer for interfering
with the agreement by inducing such breach.
In Continental Insurance Co. v. Federal Insurance Co., °' two fire insurers were present upon the same risk. Both policies in question contained identical "other insurance" or "pro rata" clauses which provided
for the usual pro-rating in accordance with the respective policy limits.
The first insurer paid the loss in full after the second had refused to contribute. Did the first insurer lose its entitlement to contribution when it
paid more than its pro rata share on the well entrenched principle that
restitution is unavailable to volunteers or officious intermeddlers? The
court held that such overpayment and assumption of the responsibility
98. See GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2001 (1968).
99. 245 Ga. 475, 265 S.E.2d 774 (1980), aff'g Unigard Ins. Co. v. Zimmerman's, Inc., 151
Ga. App. 394, 259 S.E.2d 652 (1979).
100. 245 Ga. at 476, 265 S.E.2d at 775.
101. 153 Ga. App. 712, 266 S.E.2d 351 (1980), petition for cert. filed.
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for full settlement did not place upon the first insurer the onus of being a
volunteer. To deprive it of restitution in the form of contribution would
create the undesirable situation of rewarding the co-insurer for refusing
to honor its contractual obligations and of thwarting the sound public
policy encouraging insurers to make swift settlement of claims. This policy is consonant with the recent thrust of authority in this country. 10 2
K.

Waiver and Estoppel

Antiwaiver clauses, while valid and binding, may themselves be waived
by the insurer or the insurer may by vurtue of its own conduct become
estopped from asserting them. The decision in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mills Plumbing Co.108 demonstrates that this rule, which is but
a corollary of the principle that a party may dispense with an express
condition intended for its benefit, is definitely part of Georgia law. A business entity, which had secured comprehensive liability insurance while a
partnership, failed to notify its insurer that it had subsequently become
incorporated although premium payments were thereafter made in the
form of checks drawn on the new corporate account. Seven months after
this metamorphosis, the insurer had an independent agency perform an
audit on its insured to determine whether or not premiums should be
adjusted. The audit revealed certain changes in business operations because of the incorporation which might affect the determination of future
premiums. "These changes were reflected on the audit work sheets which,
while not directly indicating that the figures were based upon the fact of
incorporation, clearly designated that the audit had been conducted on a
corporateentity."'" The insurer thereupon made an upward adjustment
of the premiums. When a casualty occurred some time later the insurer
denied liability, relying on a formidable array of policy conditions which
included the usual provision that notice to or knowledge by agents would
not effect a waiver of any part of the policy or work an estoppel against
the insurer, and that all changes, particularly assignments of the policy,
could be effected only by an endorsement issued to form part of the
policy.
The court of appeals held that the change in the legal status of the
insured, which otherwise continued its operations in the same manner as
before, "did not, in the strictest sense of the word, introduce a 'stranger'
to the risks insured against under the policy." 10 5 The insurer knew of the
change in legal status through the audit reports. Instead of refunding the
102. 8 J. APPLEMAN,
103.
104.
105.

INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE

397, § 4913 (1942).

152 Ga. App. 531, 263 S.E.2d 270 (1979), petition for cert. filed.
Id. (emphasis added).
152 Ga. App. at 533, 263 S.E.2d at 272.
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premiums to which by its own theory it was no longer entitled, the insurer retained the premiums and began accepting from the corporation
the increased premiums which it had determined were due for the added
risks involved in continued coverage. The insurer could not "run with the
hares and hold with the hounds". It was estopped from denying coverage
because it had, by its past actions, elected to treat the corporation as an
assignee of the policy and had enjoyed the benefits of that election.
IV.
A.

LIFE, HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE

Designation of Beneficiary

In Watkins v. Davis,1 an interpleader action involving a purported
change of beneficiary of a life insurance policy made by the insured in a
signed document nineteen days prior to his suicide, the judge instructed
the jury in pertinent part that "in order to void a change of beneficiary
on the ground of mental incapacity . ..the person making the change
must have been non compos mentis, that is, entirely without understanding, at the time the change was made."107 It was contended that this
charge was inconsistent with Ison v. Geiger,"' in which the supreme court
had held that for a contract to be valid, a party "must be possessed of
mind and reason equal to a clear and full understanding of the nature
and consequences of his or her act- in making the contract 10 9 If "full"
understanding was the only validating condition, then it followed that
anything less than "full" understanding was an invalidating condition.
Hence, the charge had misstated the test when it required an entire lack
of understanding as the test for invalidating.
It was held that the charge was nevertheless correct in light of the supreme court's earlier reconciliation of seemingly inconsistent formulations
in its own opinions when it said that "one who has not the strength of
mind and reason equal to a clear and full understanding of his act in
making a contract is one who is afflicted with an entire loss of understanding."' 0 The language of the charge and that of Ison were thus "opposite sides of the same coin" rather than extremes of a broad continuum
as was contended.

106.

152 Ga. App. 735, 263 S.E.2d 704 (1979).

107.

Id. at 736-37, 263 S.E.2d at 706 (emphasis added).

108.

179 Ga. 798, 177 S.E. 596 (1934).

109.

Id. at 799, 177 S.E. at 597.

110.

152 Ga. App. at 737, 263 S.E.2d at 706 (1979).
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B.

Group Insurance

In Morrison Assurance Co., Inc. v. Armstrong,"' the insured received a
participation certificate under a group insurance policy which provided
coverage for lost wages and medical expenses. The certificate set forth
certain limitations upon coverage which excluded in pertinent part benefits for "[O]ccupational injury or disease incurred in the course of working for an employer other than the Group Policyholder,who is subject to
the Workmen's Compensation law. ...."si Attached to this certificate
was a cover letter in the form of a printed document evincing her coverage under the group policy and stating that the insurer and the employer
as master policyholders "hereby agree that the policy is amended as folThe text which followed contained an adjusted schedule
lows: ...... ",I
of benefits payable to the specified insureds and their dependents.
When the insured was disabled during the course of her employment
with the group policyholder, she submitted a claim based on the language
of the certificate which clearly covered her. The insurer denied coverage
in reliance upon the language of the master policy which excluded occupational injuries incurred in the course of working for any employer covered by workmen's compensation law. The court of appeals reluctantly
held for the insurer because of the boiler-plate incorporation-by-reference
clause in the certificate which provided that the insurance was "subject in
every respect to the terms of the Policy, which alone constitutes the contract."' The plain effect of this clause was to have the master policy
supersede conflicting terms in the certificate. This also disposed of the
insured's argument that the cover letter received by her effected an
amendment of the master policy. The cover letter only amended the
schedule of benefits and not the entire policy, and the certificate, although attached to the cover letter, was not itself an "amendment" of the
policy.
The court of appeals observed that justice was not well served by a rule
of law which in a slot-machine fashion resolves conflicts between participation certificates and group master policies in favor of the latter and
thereby eschews contra proferentem as a rule of construction and ignores
the trend towards consumer protection now recognized in all areas of the
law. Although it felt constrained to apply this harsh rule because of firm
precedents, the court expressed the hope that it would eventually yield to
remedial legislation.115
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

152 Ga. App. 885, 264 S.E.2d 320 (1980).
Id. at 886, 264 S.E.2d at 321.
Id. at 885, 264 S.E.2d at 321.
Id. at 888, 264 S.E.2d at 322.
Perhaps one way for the general assembly to avoid the "sledgehammer use of public
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That group insurance disputes do not readily yield to the facile dispensations of agency law is again illustrated by cases such as Rider v. Westinghouse Electric Corp."' An employer had purchased a group occupational travel accident insurance policy covering all its employees save
those whose principal job assignment was driving company-owned or
leased motor vehicles. Once a year the employer informed each employee
in a highly personalized statement of the particular "accrued benefits"
package available to the employee, which varied according to tenure and
salary. Each such communication advised the recipient to "take this
statement home and review it with your family"' 7 and was generally
drafted in a style suitable to a concerned paterfamilias. Yet it did not
reveal that there was any group policy covering any of the benefits described, or that the benefits were somehow subject to limitations and exclusions in such policy.
The employee was told that $25,000 in travel accident insurance would
be paid in case of his accidental death while traveling on company business. When his widow filed an accidental death claim, she was told that
the "$25,000" figure next to the printed designation of "Travel Accident
Insurance" benefits was but a computer printout error which would not
be controlling over the language of the group policy that specifically excluded her husband because his principal job assignment had been the
operation of company vehicles. Did she have a claim against the insurer
or, in the alternative, against the employer?
Although unable to reach a conclusionary determination because of issues of fact raised in the record, the court of appeals clarified a number of
legal propositions in reversing and remanding the case in part.
First, absent specific indicia of an intended agency relationship, the
employer is not an agent of the group insurer for purposes of informing
the employee-beneficiaries of the contents of the policy." 8 If the employer as party to the insurance contract is to be classified as an agent at
all rather than as an intermediary sui juris occupying a limited fiduciary
status,' 1 then it must be as an agent for its employees. The employer in
seeking to obtain an inexpensive and yet comprehensive protection plan
policy" is to come up with a statute which distinguishes between situations where the
master policy is meant to supplement and clarify broad categories in the participation certificate, and situations where there exists a true conflict between the two documents. In the
former, the consumer is put on notice that promising labels may have certain organic limitations too detailed to be spelled out in the certificate; in the latter, such notice is lacking, if
one discounts the disingenuous "omnibus" clause which subjects all terms to the master
policy. Only "true conflicts" need to be addressed.
116. 152 Ga. App. 805, 264 S.E.2d 276 (1979), petition for cert. filed.
117. Id. at 805, 264 S.E.2d at 278.
118. Id. at 807, 264 S.E.2d at 279.
119. See generally R. KEETON, BAsIc TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 2.8(b) (1971).

INSURANCE

1980]

for its employees is representing itself and those to be covered by the
plan and not the insurer. The employer and not the insurer may thus
become liable to the employees for misinforming them in regard to policy
contents.
Second, even if the employer were treated as the insurer's agent, the
insurer would not be liable in this case on any theory of implied waiver or
estoppel because these doctrines are designed to dispense with conditions
of liability but not to bring within the coverage of a policy risks that were
originally beyond its terms."10 One cannot readily "waive" oneself into a
brand new obligation.
Third, documents, entire and complete unto themselves, by which the
employer, in that capacity, seeks to inform its employees of the benefits
to which they are entitled, without specifying the ultimate source, other
than the fact of employment, from which those benefits are to derive,""
become part of the employer's contractual obligation according to their
terms. The employer may only avoid or limit such liability on a showing
that its employees were afforded notice that the benefits represented were
otherwise qualified. 22 The adequacy of such notice is generally a question for the jury. 2 '
V.
A.

AUTOMOBILE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE

Defense-Liability Insurer's Obligation to Extend

In Great American Insurance Co. v. McKemie,' 2'4 the supreme court
clarified the liability insurer's contractual obligation to defend its insured
by narrowing it. The insurer's obligation to defend is primarily delineated
by the allegations asserted in the complaint against the insurer. If the
allegations state a claim that is formally within the coverage, the insurer
must defend the suit even if the "true" facts known show that the suit is
groundless or outside the coverage. The reverse may also be true. If the
allegations state a claim that is outside the coverage the insurer must defend the suit if the "true" facts known at that time reveal that the claim
is within the coverage. However, the correctness of the insurer's decision
to defend or not is determined by the information the insurer had at the
outset when the decision was made. It cannot be determined by "laterrevealed facts", such as a deposition injected into the case by a plaintiff
120. 152 Ga. App. at 808, 264 S.E.2d at 279, quoting from Ballinger v. C & S Bank, 139
Ga. App. 686, 689, 229 S.E.2d 498, 501 (1976).
121. Id. at 807, 264 S.E.2d at 279.
122. Id. at 811, 264 S.E.2d at 281 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 811-12, 264 S.E.2d at 281.
124. 244 Ga. 84, 259 S.E.2d 39 (1979), rev'g McKemie v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 149 Ga.
App. 19, 253 S.E.2d 399 (1979).
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at a later state in the proceedings, of which the insurer had no notice at
the time it refused to defend. Such "later-revealed facts" doctrine would
compel the insurer to monitor the case throughout to be sure that its
duty did not arise later. Such a burden would be "intolerable."' 2"
Is an insurer estopped from claiming noncoverage if it does not obtain a
reservation of rights agreement from the insured until more than two
weeks after it assumes the defense of a suit against the insured? Not necessarily! In Moody v. Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Co., 2 it
was undisputed that the insureds had not notified the insurer of the existence of a personal injury suit against them until the last day on which
defensive pleadings could be filed without default. The insurer immediately retained counsel and filed a timely answer but did not obtain a reservation of rights agreement until sixteen days later. The court held that
the generally accepted rule-that if a liability insurer assumes and conducts the defense of an action brought against its insured with actual or
constructive knowledge of a ground for forfeiture or noncoverage, the insurer is thereafter estopped from asserting such forfeiture or noncoverage
unless it has entered upon the defense under a proper reservation of
rights-was not applicable."2 "
No such estoppel resulted in this particular case since the insureds' delay in notifying the insurer of the suit had deprived the insurer of any
opportunity to investigate the claim and make a meaningful decision as
to coverage prior to filing a hurriedly drafted answer to avert a default.
B.

No-Fault Insurance

Fifteen appellate cases attest to the fact that Georgia's Motor Vehicle
Accidents Reparations Act, amended no less than thirteen times since its
passage in 1974,12 s has remained reliably litigation-prone!
Its constitutionality was again upheld when the supreme court inTeasley v. Mathis'2" skewered the argument that the Act's disallowance of exemplary damages in litigation involving less than "serious injury" violated due process and equal protection because it resulted in an arbitrary
exemption from the general policy of using exemplary damages to deter
and punish wrongdoers for reckless conduct. The court held that such
125. Id. The court of appeals opinion was premised on the theory that such duty could
"spring up" at any time during such proceedings.
126. 152 Ga. App. 576, 263 S.E.2d 495 (1979).
127. Id. at 577, 263 S.E.2d at 496 (emphasis added) citing Continental Ins. Co. v.
Weekes, 140 Ga. App. 791, 232 S.E.2d 80 (1976); Gant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
109 Ga. App. 41, 134 S.E.2d 886 (1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 104
Ga. App. 815, 123 S.E.2d 191 (1961).
128. See GA. CODE ANN. § 56-34(b) (1977).
129. 243 Ga. 561, 255 S.E.2d 57 (1979).
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disallowance was rationally related to the purpose of the no-fault statute,
which is to eliminate wasteful litigation over moderate claims and to curb
collateral litigation in order to expedite payments of such claims. It also
held that the plaintiff's right of access to the courts and entitlement to a
jury trial was no more impaired by the no-fault statute than it would be
by any other enactment modifying or abrogating common law rights of
action, a form of intervention which the legislative branch of government
could constitutionally accomplish. 80
Conflicts between no-fault legislation and another and older scheme for
social insurance, the Workers' Compensation Act,' 81 also clamored for disposition. While the no-fault law provides that benefits "shall not be reduced or eliminated by any workers' compensation benefits . . -'.the
workers' compensation law provides that the "rights and remedies herein
granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of
such employee . . . at common law or otherwise .... "188 This has been
interpreted consistently to mean that, where the workers' compensation
law is applicable, it provides an exclusive remedy against the employer."'
In light of this seeming conflict, what is the legal posture of an employee
who was injured while driving his employer's tractor-trailer "rig" in the
course of his employment and who received and continued to receive
workers' compensation benefits from his employer? In Freeman v. Ryder
Truck Lines, Inc.'8 G the supreme court held that the later no-fault law
did not repeal by implication the earlier workers' compensation law. The
court took the position that the statutes could be readily reconciled. The
employee, when making a claim against his own no-fault carrier covering
his own vehicle, may collect in full without suffering any reduction because of collateral workers' compensation benefits received from his employer. 8 6 Yet, the employee cannot collect no-fault benefits under his employer's insurance, whose liability is limited to that mandated by the
Workers' Compensation Act.'87 The court reasoned that the no-fault act
"has no application to employers who are already obligated under Workmen's [sic] Compensation to their employees, and that No-Fault has
neither changed that statutory obligation nor increased an employer's

130. 243 Ga. at 564, 255 S.E.2d at 58.
131. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 114-1 et seq. (Supp. 1980).
132. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3409b(a) (Supp. 1979).
133.

GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103 (Supp. 1980).

134. See, e.g., Smith v. White Lift, Inc., 145 Ga. App. 596, 244 S.E.2d 117 (1978); Floyd
v. McFolley, 131 Ga. App. 4, 205 S.E.2d 29 (1974).
135. 244 Ga. 80, 259 S.E.2d 36 (1979).
136. Id. at 83, 259 S.E.2d at 39. The court cited GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3407b(a) (Supp.
1980).
137. Id. The court cited GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103 (Supp. 1980).
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burden to pay compensation for a favored class of employees."' 8
What is the legal posture of an employee who suffers a work-related
injury while occupying her employer's car as a passenger if it transpires
that the employer, although required to do so, had purchased no workers'
compensation insurance but had purchased no-fault insurance on the vehicle involved in the accident in question? The court in Fox v. Stanish"'
held that the employee was barred from any remedy except that provided
by the workers' compensation law. This necessarily meant that the employee could not bring an action in tort against the employer, nor require
payments under the liability provisions of the no-fault act, although she
could treat him as a self-insurer and file a claim under the act, as well as
seek a penalty and attorney fees. Her predicament was not altered by the
fact that her employer had chosen not to carry worker's compensation
coverage.
What is the legal posture of an owner-operator who does not carry nofault insurance or who, although carrying the required no-fault insurance,
has failed for whatever reason to recover no-fault benefits from his own
insurer? May he recover in tort, from the other operator, that part of his
economic loss for which no-fault economic loss benefits may have been
technically available140 but were not actually recovered? In Davidson v.
Bradford,'4 the supreme court held that this question was plainly answered by the no-fault act which imposes upon owners of motor vehicles
required to be registered in Georgia, a mandatory duty to secure minimum insurance coverage142 and then precludes such owners from recovering from tortfeasors in damages those economic loss benefits to which
they are eligible and which are available under the no-fault act.1 4 ' Eligibility in a legal sense, and not actual receipt of no-fault benefits, thus
emerges as the touchstone of the tortfeasor's suability for damages from
economic loss. It is to be noted that earlier decisions by the court of appeals which held that non-owner operators and passengers could recover
no-fault economic benefits losses against tortfeasors'"4 are unaffected by
the decision in Davidson. The supreme court held that the earlier decisions were distinguishable from the case sub judice because they involved
138. 244 Ga. at 83, 259 S.E.2d at 39, quoting from IML Fright, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d
296, 297 (Utah 1975). The favored class would be those employees fortunate enough to be
driving the employer's vehicle rather than their own.
139. 150 Ga. App. 537, 258 S.E.2d 190 (1979).

140.

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 56-3403(b) (1977).

141. 245 Ga. 8, 262 S.E.2d 780 (1980), rev'g Davidson v. Bradford, 150 Ga. App. 625, 258
S.E.2d 235 (1979).
142. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3403(b) (1977).

143.

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 56-3410b(b) (1977).

144. Jenkins v. Vaughn, 146 Ga. App. 801, 247 S.E.2d 485 (1978), and Eidson v. Reagin,
146 Ga. App. 814, 247 S.E.2d 486 (1978).
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accident victims who were not required to carry no-fault insurance and
who were placed in a position where they could not control whether the
vehicles in which they were riding were properly insured under the law.'"
It is accepted that statutory provisions enter into and form a part of all
contracts of insurance to which they are applicable, and that in case of
conflict between an insurance policy and a statutory provision the latter
controls." Practically, this principle comes into play when insurers introduce coverage provisions that are more restricted, and exclusions that are
more inclusive than the statute seems to allow. In State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Landskroener,14 7 a no-fault policy excluded
from coverage "bodily injury sustained by any person while operating...
a motor vehicle owned by the named insured or any relative . . .and
48
such vehicle is not an insured vehicle.'
The no-fault act provided only an exclusion from coverage of persons
who sustained accidental bodily injury ". . . while occupying a motor vehicle owned by such person which is not insured . . .
Was a wife
covered under her own no-fault policy while driving her husband's uninsured automobile? The court held that she was covered because the exclusion in the policy was broader than that permitted by the statute
which plainly excluded coverage only as to persons who were occupying
their own uninsured vehicles and not uninsured vehicles owned by
relatives.J 6
The no-fault act provides that the term "insured" shall include, in addition to the named insured, "his spouse and children if residing in the
same household, the relatives of either . . .,any pedestrian struck by the
insured vehicle, and any other person using or occupying the insured vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured or his
spouse."' 5' May a liability insurer exclude one or more of the enumerated
classes of persons from its definition of "insured"? In Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Skinner'51 the supreme court held that it may do so, but only in
regard to the liability portion of the no-fault policy. In regard to the personal injury protection ("PIP") provisions or no-fault portion of the policy it must extend coverage to all those who are defined as "insured"
",'49

145. 245 Ga. at 11-12, 26 S.E.2d at 783.
146. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Landskroener, 150 Ga. App. 308, 309, 257 S.E.2d
376, 378 (1979), quoting from Nelson v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 804, 807, 147
S.E.2d 424, 426 (1966), citing Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Hunter, 184 Ga. 196, 202,
190 S.E. 598, 601 (1937).
147. 150 Ga. App. at 308, 257 S.E.2d at 376.
148. Id., 257 S.E.2d at 377.
149. Id. at 309, 257 S.E.2d at 377 (emphasis in original).
150. Id.
151. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3402b(b) (1977).
152. 150 Ga. App. 106, 257 S.E.2d 4 (1979) petition for cert. filed.
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under the statute." 8
In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v.Musgrove'" the operator of a farm tractor was seriously injured in a collision with a truck.
The owner of the tractor had no less than three policies insuring the tractor, each providing for $5000 basic no-fault benefits and $5000 additional
no-fault benefits. Was he entitled to recover $15,000 in additional benefits by collecting all three policies? It was held that such "stacking" was
prohibited by a provision found in all three policies which stated that
"regardless of the number of persons insured, policies, or bonds applicable . . . , liability for additional personal injury protection benefits with
respect to bodily injury sustained by any one eligible injured person in
any one motor vehicle acident shall not exceed in the aggregate the
amount set forth in the Declaration."1 55 The court concluded that this
provision was authorized by the no-fault act which states that "the total
benefits required to be paid . . .shall not exceed the sum of $5000 per
each individual covered . ..or such greater amount of coverage as has
been purchased on an optional basis . . .regardless of the number of
insurers providing such benefits or of the number of policies providing
such coverage."'" The effect of the policy provision was to limit recovery
to the highest amount of additional PIP purchased on any one policy. For
example, if the insured had two policies, one with $10,000 additional PIP,
and one with $5000 additional PIP, he would recover up to $10,000 but
not up to $15,000. Since all three policies here were for $5000 additional
PIP, his recovery was correspondingly limited to $5000.
What is the insurer's liability under the basic PIP which requires
"compensation .. .up to an aggregate minimum limit of $5000. . .for
. . .85 per cent of the loss of income or earnings during disability with a
maximum benefit of $200 per week. . . "?'" Two cases addressed themselves to this question. In GeorgiaFarm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Nelson,'8 the insurer contended that its liability for lost earnings was
limited to $1,000, apparently on the ingenious assumption that the statutory limit on necessary medical expenses ($2,500) and on funeral services
and burial expenses ($1,500) amounted to $4,000, which left only $1,000
for lost earnings. It was held that the only limit on lost earnings was the
aggregate limit of $5,000. The difference between $5,000 and the amounts

153.
§
tion of
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
ANN.

Id. at 107, 257 S.E.2d at 5. It is difficult to see how it can be argued that GA. CODE
56-3403b(a) does not impose a mandatory coverage requirement on the liability porthe policy as well.
153 Ga. App. 690, 266 S.E.2d 228 (1980), petition for cert. filed.
Id. at 691, 266 S.E.2d at 229 (emphasis different from original).
GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3402b(i) (1977).
GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3403b(b)(2) (1977).
153 Ga. App. 623, 266 S.E.2d 299 (1980), petition for cert. filed.
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actually paid for medical and funeral expenses, which may be considerably less than the $4,000 maximum, was thus available to indemnify the
insured for lost earnings.
59
In Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' the insured was injured and her husband killed in an automobile collision. According to the insured's affidavit she had been supplying full time bookkeeping and clerical services to her husband, in his capacity as head and
sole proprietor of an accounting firm, prior to the accident. While she did
not receive direct compensation in the form of a salary for services rendered, she did have the full use, enjoyment and benefit of a portion of the
net profits of the business as compensation for her participation therein.
The income from the business, which was partially generated by the insured's saving the expense of having to hire other help, was deposited to
the joint account of the spouses. Some part of that income belonged to
the insured and she had access to it on a regular basis. The court held
that "income or earnings" was not limited to salaries and wages but included profits of a business generated through the labor of an insured
without substantial assistance by others. In light of the facts deposed, it
was error to grant a summary judgment in favor of the insurer.
In Clinton v. National Indemnity Co.,' 60 a volunteer fireman went to
the scene of a fire where another fireman had brought a municipal fire
truck. After the other fireman unwound the hose, the volunteer fireman
held the hose at the nozzle and sprayed water on a gas tank to keep it
from overheating. The volunteer fireman then signaled that he needed to
readjust the hose to reach another tank. The operator of the truck turned
off the water pressure and for some reason the hose jerked and snaked
loose, throwing the volunteer fireman to the ground and injuring him.
Was the volunteer fireman covered under the no-fault policy covering the
fire truck? The court held that he was not. To be covered, his accidental
injury must have been sustained either while occupying the motor vehicle
or while, as a pedestrian, he was struck by it."' He was not "occupying"
the vehicle in the sense of being in or on the motor vehicle or engaged in
the immediate act of entering or alighting from it as provided by statute. 62 The volunteer fireman had not entered the fire truck, except to get
up on the backboard plate, loosen the hose nozzle, pull the hose off, and
to go around to the back of the burning mobile home with it."' 6 Nor was
164
he injured by being struck by the motor vehicle while a pedestrian.

Ga. App. 825, 264 S.E.2d 296 (1979), petition for cert. filed.
Ga. App. 491, 265 S.E.2d 841 (1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3407 (Supp. 1980).
CODE ANN. § 56-3402b(i) (1977) (emphasis added).
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160.
161.
162.
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See
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153 Ga. at 494, 265 S.E.2d at 842.

164.

See GA. CODE ANN.
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56-3402b(b) (1977).
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Technically speaking, his injury resulted from a pressure change in the
water hose as the water container in the truck was being "unloaded"
through the medium of the pump. Unfortunately, conduct in the course
of loading and unloading a motor vehicle is expressly excluded from coverage "unless the conduct occurs while occupying it.' " 5
C.

Omnibus Clause

The omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy defined the word
"insured" as including". . . any other person while using the owned motor vehicle, provided the operation and the actual use of such vehicle are
with the permission of the named insured or such spouse and are within
the scope of such permission.'I How did this language affect the recurring situation of an authorized user allowing another person to drive the
automobile - the case of the permittee's permittee? In DeWorken v.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,"" the named insured and owner of an
automobile gave special permission to his son Mike to drive the automobile for an evening. Mike, accompanied by one Underwood, drove the car
to his girlfriend's house and, when he found out that she would be unable
to leave home that night, decided to stay at her home and loaned the car
to Underwood. An accident occurred later that night when Underwood
was returning to pick up Mike. There was a standing policy, communicated to Mike and Underwood and never violated previously, that no one
outside of the family was to operate the automobile. The court held that
since there was no evidence of express or implied permission, coverage
was plainly precluded by the particular wording of the policy which stipulated that both the operation and the actual use had to be within the
scope of the permission granted.'"8
The court distinguished Strickland v.Georgia Casualty & Insurance
Co.' 6' which dealt with the omnibus clause found in the 1955 standard
automobile policy.170 This clause covers "any person while using the automobile . . .provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named
insured or such spouse or with the permission of either.' 7 1 In Strickland,
the court drew a distinction between operation of an automobile, in its
165. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3402b(h) (1977).
166. DeWorken v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 248, 249, 259 S.E.2d 490,
492 (1979) (emphasis different from original).
167. 151 Ga. App. at 248, 259 S.E.2d at 490, petition for cert. filed.
168. Id. at 249, 259 S.E.2d at 492.
169. 224 Ga. 487, 162 S.E.2d 421 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see Pock, Insurance, Annual Survey of Ga. Law, 21 MERCER L. REv. 167, 170 (1969).
170. J. AUSTIN & N. RISJORD, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES Standard Provi-

sions and app. 19 (1964).
171.

225 Ga. at 488, 162 S.E.2d at 423.
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narrow signification of driving it, and use of an automobile, in its broad
signification of employing it for a particular purpose, such as a specific
trip. If the actual use by the permittee was authorized then it mattered
not that the mode of operation was unauthorized. The permittee's permittee was covered!
It is interesting and not at all otiose to speculate just how the restrictive language of the 1966 standard automobile policy

72

would fare under

the DeWorken-Strickland line of authority. It covers "any other person
using such automobile with the permission of the named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other actual use
thereof is within the scope of such permission.1 1 3 It is probable that, despite the difference in wording, the result would be the same as in
DeWorken. Underwood would have to prove either that his actual operation was within the scope of permission or that his actual use was within
the scope of permission. Since he could prove neither, he would not be
4
7

covered.1

D. Uninsured Motorist Coverage
The macabre facts of American ProtectionInsurance Co. v. Parker,"
a case of first impression, have a certain bloodcurdling quality even to
those who imagine themselves quite unflappable! The plaintiff, while occupying the car she owned, had allowed her "friend" to take the wheel.
When the "friend" stopped in an insolated area other than that to which
permission extended, plaintiff remonstrated and reached out to the ignition switch, whereupon the "friend" attacked and stabbed her. She twice
escaped from the car, but was twice recaptured and beaten. The "friend"
then placed plaintiff, while in a semi-conscious condition, on the road behind the car, placed the vehicle in reverse and ran over her body, then
put the car in gear driving the wheels over her body a second time and
made his escape, leaving her for dead. The plaintiff sustained serious injuries. Was this attempted murder covered under the uninsured motorist
rider of her liability policy?
In holding that plaintiff was indeed covered, the court reasoned as fol172. R. KEETON, BASiC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW app. H (1971).
173. Id.
174. In fact it is doubtful whether Underwood would have recovered under the broad
language of the 1955 standard automobile policy involved in Strickland. A fair reading of
the case suggests that he would have to show either that he was operating the car while
Mike, the original permittee, was in the car with him or that, although Mike was not in the
car with him, he was somehow serving a purpose of Mike, such as running an errand for
him. It is difficult to visualize just how Underwood was advancing any of Mike's purposes
when he used the car on a frolic of his own.
175. 150 Ga. App. 732, 258 S.E.2d 540 (1979), petition for cert. filed.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

110

[Vol. 32

lows: First, her injuries were caused by accident in the sense that the
occurrence causing the injuries was unforeseen, unusual, and unexpected
when viewed through plaintiff's eyes - the optic of the victim and not
that of the tortfeasor. Second, the automobile which struck her was uninsured under the language of the insuring agreement, which specifically
defines uninsured automobile "as one with respect to the ownership or
use of which there is no bodily injury insurance applicable at the time of
17
the accident"'

6

and excludes from the definition of insured automobile

"any automobile while being used without the permission of the own-

er."' 177 Third, the standard exclusion providing that the uninsured motor-

ist coverage "does not apply. . . to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile (other than the insured automobile) owned by the
named insured or a relative, or through being struck by such automobile'

58

was irrelevant to her case. This exclusion was designed for and

makes sense only in the frequently arising garden-variety situation where
the named insured or resident relative covered by the policy owns an uninsured automobile also, and these cars collide. Excluding coverage in
such situation simply prevents automobile owners from insuring a fleet of
cars for the price of insuring a single car. The language of the exclusion
thus yields to ready reconciliation with the definition of uninsured
automobiles. Yet even if, arguendo, such reconciliation were impossible,
application of contra proferentem to ambiguities in contracts of adhesion
would still save the day for the plaintiff.
Can a person who at the time of an automobile collision has extant a
liability policy be treated as an uninsured motorist because he absconds
after the collision and cannot be found for service? The court in Smith v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co. "' held that such post-event concealment did not alter the tortfeasor's status as an insured motorist. The fact
that the Georgia Code allows a John Doe action against an unknown
tortfeasor "whether he is insured or not,"'8 0 does not mean that a
tortfeasor whose name is known but who conceals his location for purposes of service should be considered an uninsured motorist whether he is
insured or not. The Georgia Code merely creates a presumption that the
unknown motorist is uninsured.' 8 1 This presumption
cannot apply where
82
the motorist is known and known to be insured.1
176. Id. at 734, 258 S.E.2d at 542 (emphasis in original).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 735, 258 S.E.2d at 543.
179. 153 Ga. App. 38, 264 S.E.2d 530 (1980), petition for cert. filed.
180. Id. at 39, 264 S.E.2d at 531. The court was paraphrasing GA. CODE ANN. § 56407.1(b) and (d) (1977).
181. 153 Ga. App. at 39, 264 S.E.2d at 532.
182. Id. The court suggested that the general assembly adopt remedial legislation on this
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VI.
A.

PROPERTY INSURANCE

Standard or Union Mortgage Clause

In Federal National Mortgage Association v. Hanover Insurance
a mortgage-loss payee under a fire policy covering an owner-occupied dwelling was required by the terms of the policy to notify the insurer
"of any change of ownership . . . which shall come to the knowledge of
said mortgagee." ' "
Was the mortgagee required to notify the insurer of the "change of
ownership" which occurred when it bought the property after exercising
the power in the security deed upon default of the owner? The supreme
court held that no notification was required. The result of such proceedings was merely an enlargement or increase of the mortgagee's original
interest in the property rather than a "change of ownership" within the
intent of the notice requirement. Any other construction would eviscerate
the standard provision that "this insurance . . . shall not be invalidated
by any . . . foreclosure or other proceedings or notice of sale relating to
the property." '8 5 This provision is plainly meant for the protection of the
mortgagee-loss payee as a third party beneficiary, who thus retains its
insurable interest and continues as an insured under the policy.
Co., 1 88

point.
183.

243 Ga. 609, 255 S.E.2d 685 (1979), rev'g Hanover Ins. Co. v. Federal Nat'l Mort-

gage Ass'n, 147 Ga. App. 573, 249 S.E.2d 626 (1978).
184. Id. at 610, 255 S.E.2d at 685.
185. Id. 255 S.E.2d at 685, quoting from the policy at issue.

